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Effective livestock disease management is a fundamental necessity for producers to 
provide and the government to guarantee a safe and secure food supply for consumers. 
It is the responsibility of both parties to ensure that the industry is appropriately 
protected from Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs). Producers, consumers, communities, 
businesses, and the environment can all suffer when an FAD outbreak occurs. To what 
extent an outbreak can be damaging depends greatly on the level of biosecurity 
producers have in place and the livestock disease management procedures 
government officials have created. Currently in the United States, more work can be 
done on both sides. This study looks at what producers are currently doing in regard to 
disease prevention on their operations, what they prefer, and what they are willing to 
improve upon.  
Livestock producers were surveyed, and their responses were analyzed in efforts 
to answer two separate questions: What are poultry producers’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) to adopt on-farm carcass disposal capabilities, and what indemnity policy do 
feedlot operators prefer. Preventative biosecurity at the farm level is covered thoroughly 
throughout the literature, however, a minimal amount of research has been conducted 
on producers’ preferences and decision-making processes post-FAD outbreak, which is 
the focus of this work. Individual operation characteristics provided additional factors for 
the econometric analysis of each study. A one and one-half bound dichotomous choice 
question allowed an interval regression model to be estimated for poultry producers 
WTP for on-farm carcass disposal showing poultry producers were willing to pay 
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$15,651 on average (one-time payment). Producers ranked four different indemnity 
policies in order of preference, which allowed a ranked-order probit model to estimate 
what policies are preferred by feedlot operators and the factors contributing to that 
policy. In general, livestock insurance with government subsidized premiums was the 
second-best choice behind status quo policy potentially providing a next best option in 
terms of producer preferences. By analyzing this type of producer information, policy 
writers and industry leaders can create new policies that both encourage early disease 
reporting and incentivize greater biosecurity implementation, which will reduce the 
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With value of agricultural production totaling nearly $400 billion in 2016, the agriculture 
industry has and will continue to play a vital role in the U.S. economy (USDA-ERS 
2016b). More specifically, animal agriculture represents a major portion of that value. 
The top agricultural commodity in the United States is cattle and calves and both dairy 
and broiler production are included in the top five U.S. commodities (USDA-ERS 
2016a). It is imperative that these industries remain protected as livestock producers 
face countless coinciding risks that many other businesses may not. Weather, disease, 
the environment, public-health, as well as, animal welfare are just a few issues that 
livestock producers manage, and it is up to them to balance each risk, along with the 
specific regulations that accompany them. The U.S. government has many policies in 
place to assist farmers in handling these risks. In particular, if a livestock disease 
outbreak occurs, there is legislation in place to minimize damages and costs to the 
farm, the public, the environment, and the government itself.  
The following two chapters will provide an in-depth analysis of farmer willingness 
to pay for increased biosecurity and livestock indemnity preference by examining results 
from a livestock producer survey. By evaluating producers’ responses to current 
government policy pertaining specifically to animal agriculture in the event of a disease 
outbreak, government officials will have a more complete understanding of the 
producers’ decision-making process in the presence of such risks. Estimating 
producers’ willingness to invest in on-farm biosecurity methods will also help policy 
writers gauge future financial legislation pertaining to animal disease prevention and 
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eradication. After all, the government’s aim in regulation is to ensure that animals are 
healthy, production systems are efficient, producers are not unfairly burdened, 
consumers have a safe and secure food supply, and governmental costs to taxpayers 
are minimized. The results and conclusions of these two analyses on farmer’s 
willingness to pay and their indemnity preferences will provide valuable insight that has 
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Biosecurity procedures play a vital role in livestock disease management both in 
prevention and in management after a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) outbreak. As one 
of the more integrated livestock commodities, the U.S. poultry industry mandates certain 
biosecurity and disease safety standards, however, the decision to implement these 
practices are ultimately left up to the individual producer. These operational decisions 
occur as producers weigh the risks between short-term costs and long-run disease 
protection, which can be translated into changes in profit margins and potential moral 
hazard which occurs because biosecurity is non-excludable. Producers free-ride on 
other farms’ biosecurity expecting that if an FAD outbreak does occur, their neighbors’ 
disease protection efforts will stop it. However, despite producers weighing the risks of 
preventing a disease at the farm-level, they can neglect the levels of biosecurity 
procedures that are necessary when an outbreak happens, specifically for this study, 
on-farm carcass disposal for routine mortality. When an FAD is reported, zones are 
created around the premises that restrict the movement of animals and animal products 
across and outside of those zones in order to limit disease spread. If a poultry producer 
normally uses a disposal method such as a renderer or landfill for their routine mortality, 
they can no longer transport those carcasses offsite if their operation falls within a 
movement restricted zone forcing them find other means of on-farm disposal. This study 
estimates poultry producer willingness to pay (WTP) for on-farm carcass disposal 
methods for routine mortality during an FAD outbreak.  
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From an online producer survey, a group of poultry producers were asked 
questions about their operations’ characteristics and disease perception, along with a 
one and one-half dichotomous choice question that provided actual costs of adoption. 
An interval regression model was created to estimate the average WTP and allowed for 
the analysis of various factors that influenced the WTP. The results provide industry and 
policy writers costs and information that can be used when creating new policy and 
plans to incentivize farm-level biosecurity, while continuing to encourage disease 
reporting, which together, improves overall livestock disease management in the United 
States. 
Introduction 
Poultry, specifically chicken, has always been a main protein source for humans, 
however, throughout history, it has been inferior to both beef and pork (red meat) 
consumption, until recently (Barclay, 2012; National Chicken Council, 2017). In 2015, 
United States per capita poultry consumption surpassed that of red meat consumption 
for the first time since before 1960 with total poultry consumption ending at 105.2 
pounds per capita and total red meat consumption ending at 104.2 lbs. per capita 
(National Chicken Council, 2017). According to the literature, various factors such as 
medical research, changes in household dynamic, and even changes in prices and 
preferences in other areas of the economy explain the increase of poultry consumption 
in the United States (Barclay, 2012; O. B. Kennedy et al., 2004; Rimm, 2011; Tonsor, 
Mintert, and Schroeder, 2010).  
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Information about the healthfulness of meat is a vital contributing factor to the 
consumers’ demand. Publicly-available and reader-friendly medical research like the 
Harvard Health Letter published by the Harvard School of Health has allowed the 
average consumer to be more informed about various aspects of their health (Rimm, 
2011). In Dr. Eric Rimm’s edition of the Harvard Health Letter (2011), he explains the 
percentages of fats in animal proteins and the potential repercussions of consuming 
them, along with illustrating that chicken and turkey both have significantly lower levels 
of saturated fat than beef and pork. He shows that according to the research, high 
levels of saturated fat consumption are associated with heart disease and the facets 
that accompany it (Rimm, 2011). The same conclusion was drawn by Dr. Michael Miller 
in a study published in the American Heart Association Journal where nurses, over a 
26-year period, who consumed more than the recommended amount of red meat, 
increased their risk of chronic heart disease by thirty percent (Miller, 2010). Tonsor, 
Mintert, and Schroeder (2010) published research from a study concluding that 
increased information about such heart diseases and diet has a negative effect of 
demand for consuming beef.  Environmentally-conscious consumers may have also 
impacted the poultry consumption shift because even with the drastic advances in 
technology to produce animals more efficiently, red meat animal production has a more 
negative impact on the environment (requires more land, food and water) than poultry 
(Barclay, 2012; O. B. Kennedy et al., 2004).  
Aside from increased public information, the rise in poultry consumption can also 
be explained due to changes in household dynamics. In the same study by Tonsor, 
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Mintert, and Schroeder (2010), they also discovered that for every one percent increase 
in food purchased outside of the home, it increased poultry consumption demand by 
1.9%. Increased food consumption outside of the home (e.g. eating at restaurants) 
results from more households having both parents in the workforce thus less time to 
prepare meals at home, and it is positively related to poultry consumption because more 
restaurants serve chicken on their menus because it is cheaper than beef (Speer, 2013; 
Spiegel, 2014). Even with the affordability of poultry, it still represents a significant 
portion of the U.S. agricultural economy. In 2016, according to the United States 
Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS), the 
value of sales for poultry in the United States was approximately $38.7 billion with over 
half of those sales (67.04%) coming solely from broiler production (USDA-NASS, 2016).  
Poultry is a major component of Americans’ diet; therefore, producers need to be 
vigilant and take the necessary precautions to protect their livestock so that a healthy 
supply of poultry products is consistently available to consumers. The situation for a 
poultry farmer can change in an instant; one seemingly small disease outbreak can 
cause substantial disruptions for a poultry producer and the supply chain as a whole 
through disease and response efforts, such as depopulation and transportation 
restrictions. There are practices producers can adopt and implement to limit these types 
of risks and help facilitate business continuity during such an event. Estimating poultry 
producers’ willingness to invest in on-farm carcass disposal capabilities will provide a 
better understanding as to what incentives and disincentives policy makers should 
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There are numerous diseases that birds can acquire and cause devastating impacts to 
farms, consumers, public-health, and the economy as a whole (Hennessy and Wolf, 
2018). Two of the most common types of fatal bird diseases are Exotic Newcastle 
Disease (END) and Avian Influenza (AI). END is a viral disease that can be contracted 
by all birds. With a death rate of nearly 100 percent, END is known to be “one of that 
most infectious poultry diseases in the world” (2014 USDA-APHIS). The last reported 
commercial outbreak of END in the United States was from 2002-2003 and cost the 
federal government around $180 million to stop and eliminate the spread of the disease 
(USDA-ARS 2016).  
The bird virus that has caused the most damage to the United States in recent 
history is AI, specifically, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). This viral disease is 
carried by waterfowl and other wild birds (Hawkins et al., 2017). There is also a virus 
known as Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI). The difference between the two 
pathogenicities is if the poultry mortality rate is greater than 75 percent, then it is 
considered HPAI (OIE 2015). Due to the high mortality rates associated with the 
disease, HPAI is a great concern for both farmers and the government. The most recent 
case of HPAI was reported on March 5, 2017 as a strain H7 in Lincoln County, 
Tennessee (USDA-APHIS 2017). The poultry house consisted of 73,500 birds that, 
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once reported, were quarantined and depopulated (USDA-APHIS 2017). The disease 
was quickly controlled and no other cases around the area were reported. This was a 
major victory for the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) along 
with all other participants who were involved in the process of controlling and surveying 
the infected area, as well as, taking the necessary precautions so the disease would not 
spread to other farms or other sectors of the supply chain. The previous outbreak in 
2014-2015 did not prove to be as easily and quickly resolved. HPAI was first discovered 
in the United States in December of 2014 and lasted until June of 2015. Over the 
course of the outbreak, 42.1 million egg-layer and pullet chickens along with 7.5 million 
turkeys were depopulated, and the cost to the federal government exceeded $950 
million in taxpayer money (USDA-APHIS-VS 2016). Not only was this the largest 
outbreak and spread of HPAI in noted U.S. history, but overall, it was also the largest 
animal health event in U.S. history (Hagerman and Marsh, 2016). Action and planning 
committees were put in place after this outbreak to research and create policy and 
protocols on how to prevent such a catastrophe from happening again. It is evident that 
some progress was made from the 2015 outbreak to the most recent one in 2017, 
however, more can still be done on both the farmer-level and policy-level, such as 
increased farm-level biosecurity awareness, training and protocols, increased 
surveillance for diseased birds, and more effective indemnity payment policies that 
incentivize the implementation of biosecurity measures and disease reporting without 
financially disincentivizing these actions due to indemnity payments being too large. 
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A Biosecurity Culture 
Farmers have the first chance to prevent animal health disasters from occurring with 
biosecurity measures they have or could have in place. Biosecurity is a set of methods, 
protocols and/or actions implemented to lessen the introduction of disease and 
minimize the negative effects of an outbreak (Muhammad and Jones, 2008). Biosecurity 
is recognized as a public good because it is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. The non-
rivalry notion indicates that when a farmer implements biosecurity measures, it does not 
hinder or take away the opportunity for another farmer to implement biosecurity 
measures. Likewise, biosecurity is non-excludable because a farmer cannot prevent 
another person from reaping the benefits of biosecurity measures that they implement 
(Siekkinen et al., 2012). The entire supply chain from farm to consumer benefits from 
farm-level biosecurity. Consumers gain by having a safe, healthy food supply and 
having the peace of mind of positive animal welfare. However, biosecurity is also a 
“weaker link” public good (Burnett, 2006; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Siekkinen et al., 
2012). The level of biosecurity in place is only as great as the weakest effort. The 
farmer that takes the least amount of effort to implement biosecurity measures is also 
the farmer that has the least to lose or to protect, meaning, the community of producers’ 
biosecurity efforts are only as strong as the smallest producer (Hennessy and Wolf, 
2018).  This is the reason why biosecurity is also an externality. Whether it is a positive 
or negative externality depends on whether biosecurity is implemented or not. When a 
farmer implements biosecurity on his or her own farm, it only positively affects the 
surrounding farms. However, the reverse is also true. Producers do not always have to 
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reap the consequences of not implementing good biosecurity on their own farms; they 
free-ride off of the biosecurity that producers around them implement in hopes that if a 
disease occurs, it will be stopped by another producer (Hennessy and Wang, 2010; 
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Sumner, Bervejillo, and Jarvis, 2005). The only way this 
process can correct itself is if a “biosecurity culture” is created among farmers. This 
would consist of farmers informing and encouraging their neighbor producers to adopt 
biosecurity measures even though the financial motivations are not immediately 
identifiable (Julien and Thomson, 2011). In terms of carcass disposal biosecurity, the 
externality is evident. Depending on where a farmer disposes of their dead livestock, it 
could have immensely positive or gravely negative implications for other farmers, 
people, and the environment.  
Disposal Methods 
While animal diseases are contracted through several faucets, biosecurity, which 
includes the type of disposal method used, influences both farming and supply chain 
outcomes. Livestock carcass disposal methods are vastly discussed throughout the 
literature. Historically, the most used methods for carcass disposal have been burial and 
burning (Gwyther et al., 2011). Today, the most widely known carcass disposal methods 
are burial, incineration, composting, rendering, and landfill disposal (Blake et al., 2008; 
Bonhotal, Jean and Schwarz, Mary, 2009; Gwyther et al., 2011; Hawkins et al., 2017). 
Other current disposal methods that may be infrequently used include anaerobic 
digestion and alkaline hydrolysis, along with several others (Blake et al., 2008; Gwyther 
et al., 2011). These latter methods were developed to address environmental concerns 
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regarding carcass disposal, but they can be very costly to implement. There are pros 
and cons to each type of disposal method, but a producer selects which method will be 
the best fit financially and geographically for their individual operation. 
Disease Outbreak Zones 
Despite the best efforts of biosecurity, there can still be a disease event if there is 
enough pathogenic pressure. When a disease occurs, the “Foreign Animal Disease 
Preparedness & Response Plan,” published by the USDA-APHIS-Veterinary Services 
(USDA-APHIS-VS), outlines four different zones that are established around the 
infected farm. Figure 1.1 (all tables and figures are located in the Appendix A) displays 
a visual representation of each zone (USDA-APHIS-VS 2015). The location of where 
the outbreak is detected and reported is known as the “infected zone” and consists of 
the area around the infected premises. The perimeter of this zone must be no less than 
1.86 miles (3 km) around the infected premises. The next zone is known as the “buffer 
zone” and is a perimeter no less than 4.35 miles (7 km) beyond the infected zone 
perimeter. Both of these zones together are known as the “control area,” which is ~6.21 
miles (10 km) around the initial infected premises (Hawkins et al., 2017; USDA-APHIS-
VS 2017). Movement and transportation restrictions are placed on farms that lie within 
the “control area” in efforts to stop a disease from spreading. On-farm carcass disposal 
capacity is vital if and when a highly infectious disease outbreak occurs. The obvious 
reason is for those farms that contract the disease and are mandated to depopulate 
entire houses of birds at a time. In order to estimate producers’ perception of proactive 
disease measures, this study will focus on disposal capabilities of poultry producers that 
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lie within the “control area,” instead of the catastrophic morality that occurs on the initial 
infected premises. 
Routine Poultry Mortality 
In 2012, according to the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), there 
were 233,770 poultry farms in the United States, where there were 42,226 broiler 
operations, 198,272 layer farms, and 19,956 turkey farms (USDA-NASS 2015). Based 
on a layer hen study conducted in 2013 by the USDA-APHIS-VS National Animal Health 
Monitoring System (NAHMS) (2014), over 50% of farms experienced routine mortality at 
rates of 4% or higher. They also discovered that small farms had the highest 
percentage of higher mortality, which also reiterates the notion that biosecurity is indeed 
a weaker link good (USDA-APHIS-VS 2014).  
Routine mortality is inevitable for poultry producers. All poultry producers have 
some way of disposing of their routine mortality. However, if a major disease outbreak 
occurs, the producer’s operation falls within the control area, and their disposal choice is 
transporting the carcasses to or having them picked up to be transported to either a 
rendering facility or landfill, that producer now has to dispose their mortality through a 
different outlet since the carcasses cannot be moved off the premises to prevent 
possible spread of the disease. Even though the producer is not the one with the 
infected poultry, they still lay within in the control area, and if this happens, they may or 
may not be prepared to implement an on-farm disposal measure. According to the 
University of Tennessee Extension’s Commercial Poultry Producer’s Guide to Disposal 
Options for HPAI Mortalities in Tennessee, “all commercial poultry producers should 
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have an HPAI response plan in place” (Hawkins et al., 2017). However, through reading 
the guide, there seems to be a large emphasis on the word “should.”  Therefore, this 
unknown facet of whether or not a producer would be prepared to handle all of their 
routine mortality is dependent on several factors. One consists of the producer’s opinion 
of how soon and how often a disease outbreak could occur. If a producer does not 
already have a safe method to dispose of routine poultry mortality on their farm or the 
supplies and plan available to implement on-farm carcass disposal methods, then if the 
farm is caught within the control area, the producer may resort to measures that could 
negatively affect the surrounding community and environment. This could be as simple 
as burying carcasses too close to the ground water table and contaminating the water 
supply or throwing them in an open trench that can easily become a vector for disease 
spread (Blake et al., 2008; Gwyther et al., 2011; Henry and Bitney, 2010). These types 
of questions, along with others related to on-farm carcass disposal adoption (willingness 
to pay), will be discussed through the results and analysis of a poultry producer survey.  
Government Incentive 
When considering a producer’s WTP, other options that could incentivize biosecurity 
adoption will be analyzed. One question on the producer survey asks about a 
government cost-share program. It insinuates that if the government was willing to 
subsidize a percentage of the cost of adopting on-farm biosecurity, would the producer 
then be willing to pay the remaining percentage? Other questions consider if a poultry 
producer’s willingness to adopt could change if the decision to adopt was tied to 
indemnity payments from the government in the event of catastrophic mortality loss. 
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This latter question will be analyzed more in-depth in the next chapter of this study. 
Nonetheless, there is a challenge surrounding incentivizing producers with government 
assistance because the assistance must be great enough to persuade a farmer to adopt 
and report when disease is detected, but not so great that it discourages the farmer to 
adopt preventative and disposal biosecurity measures all together (Fraser, 2016; 
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018). 
Data 
In the fall of 2018, an online poultry producer survey was sent out by Watt Poultry USA 
and the U.S. Poultry and Egg Association to poultry producers across the United States. 
The eleven-question survey focuses on current, individual poultry operation 
management decisions, mainly, the producer’s current carcass disposal methods/plans 
and his or her WTP to increase on-farm biosecurity efforts (Appendix B). To gather 
numerical data to estimate each producer’s WTP, the survey consisted of a one and 
one-half bound (OOHB) dichotomous choice question (Bateman et al., 2004; Thompson 
et al., 2018; Tonsor, Schroeder, and Lusk, 2013). Producers were given a scenario of a 
possible impending disease and transportation restrictions and the question (Appendix 
B, Question 4) was stated “Given knowledge of this situation and the implications it 
may present to your operation, if it costs $X in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this 
capacity on your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this 
investment within the next 3 years?” $X represented a randomized cost that was 
calculated using the Mersenne Twister, Qualtrics native algorithm (Qualtrics, 2015). For 
those that indicated ‘yes,’ a follow-up question was asked to better refine their WTP 
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bound by doubling the amount they first saw, and for the ‘no’ answers, other additional 
questions were asked in efforts to flip their indicated ‘no’ to a ‘yes,’ regarding 
willingness-to-invest in biosecurity methods.  
Methodology 
Conceptual Framework  
Producers face countless decisions that involve risk for their business. These 
production decisions are made in order for the producer to maximize profit subject to a 
given level of utility that particular producer requires (Nicholson and Snyder, 2012). For 
many producers, the utility is that farming is their livelihood, it is what they know, and it 
is the thing they enjoy doing most. Above that, they are profit maximizers. Producers 
are also price takers due to their heavy involvement in both the input and output market 
sectors (Levin and Milgrom, 2004). Because they cannot set their own prices, the 
decisions regarding farm costs are vital for the producer and crucial for the government 
to understand when trying to enhance current livestock disease management policies. 
To the producer in the short run, not implementing certain biosecurity methods saves 
them money through costs associated with implementation. However, in the long run, 
producers potentially end up losing more money than they saved by not implementing 
because their operation was left disease-susceptible. Thus, biosecurity poses a 
condition to producers: short run cost-savings versus long run disease-susceptibility. 
This decision is based on risk, and because producers are thought to be risk averse 
(Mulwa et al., 2017), the decision to protect their farm against risk in the long run would 
prevail, but the producer’s perception of disease occurrence must also be considered. 
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Producer’s disease perception compared to other variables will be analyzed from 
Question 6 on the survey (Appendix B).  It is hypothesized that if producers think 
disease occurrence is less likely to impact their individual farm, then their willingness-to-
invest in biosecurity will also be less likely. Moreover, due to cost constraints facing 
producers as a result of being price takers, it is also projected that they will not have an 
exceptionally high WTP. 
Modeling 
A probit model consisting of variables from the survey questions will be used to estimate 
poultry producers’ average WTP to improve their current biosecurity methods (Hanmer 
and Kalkan, 2013; Meng et al., 2014; Mulwa et al., 2017; Okpukpara, 2016).  The probit 
model was selected as a result of the latent variable approach (1) where the dependent 
variable of this model is binary, e.g. either 1 or 0, with 1 being “will adopt” and 0 being 
“will not adopt,” and the idea that other underlying factors are influencing that decision in 
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where τ is some unknown threshold, y* is unobserved, β represents a vector of 
coefficients, X are explanatory variables, and ε is the error term, and for the probit 
model, is normally distributed. 
In looking for producer’s WTP, marginal effects must be calculated to determine 
which variables in the model change in order for the dependent variable to become 
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more likely. The maximum likelihood estimation method will be utilized to determine 
which variables increase a producer’s willingness-to-invest in on-farm carcass disposal 
due to the non-linearity of the data (Maddala, 1988; Samal et al., 2011). Equation 2 





where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution of the error term, j is the number of betas 
(β), k represents the number of variables that have coefficients, and i is the number of 
observations. Because the model will be estimated using the maximum likelihood 






In order to transform the nonlinear likelihood function (3) into a model that can be 
regressed linearly, the log must be taken, which is represented by equation 4. Finally, 
the derivative of the log-likelihood function will thus allow the variable coefficients, or 






















where βi represents the estimated coefficients in the model, n is the number of 
observations, and xi represents the variables included in the model. 
The hypothetical latent variable model for this study is illustrated by equation 6. 
The illustration includes variables that may or may not be included in the final model but 
are included in the preliminary model because they are hypothesized to have a 



















ProbOfDisease + ε 
(6) 
where BioQ is the binary dependent variable with 1 being “will adopt” and 0 being “will 
not adopt”; BioCost represents the randomized cost of adopting on-farm carcass 
disposal the producer was presented while participating in the survey; Onsite represents 
the percentage of current on-farm carcass disposal; DeathLoss represents the farm’s 
routine mortality rate; Small is a binary variable that represents the number of birds on 
the operation with 1 being farm size less than or equal to 149,999 birds and no being 
farm size greater than or equal to 150,000 birds; Midwest is a binary variable that 
incorporates the location of the operation with 1 being located in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Ohio, 
Wisconsin (See Figure 1.2) and 0 otherwise; FullOwn represents a series of binary 
variables describing the ownership of the operation with 1 representing the producer’s 
share of ownership being greater than or equal to 81 percent and 0 being less than or 
equal to 80 percent; ProbOfDisease represents a series of binary variables describing 
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the producer’s individual perception of disease risk; β represents the coefficients 
associated with the variables; and 𝜀 represents the error term for the model. 
 However, fairly large samples sizes are needed for this type of probit model to 
gain accurate estimations (Lopez-Feldman, 2012). Due to limited survey responses and 
small sample size (15 useable observations once all variables were included), an 
integral regression model was created to derive more precise WTP results. This type of 
model consists of upper and lower bounds, which enhances the results by creating a 
more accurate representation of the data.  The bounds are the costs that the producers 
were presented while taking the survey for the OOHB question (Bateman et al., 2004). 
The log-likelihood equation that was used to calculate the interval regression model can 












where for the ith feedlot operator: 𝑑𝑖
𝑁=1 when the response was NO, 𝑑𝑖
𝑌𝑁=1 if the 
response was YES-NO, and 𝑑𝑖
𝑌𝑌=1 if the response was YES-YES, 0 otherwise; Zi 
represents a series of explanatory factors, Xi are the prices presented,  and  are 
vectors of conformable coefficients (Thompson et al., 2018; Tonsor et al., 2010). The 
surveyed producers’ predicted mean WTP for the interval regression model was then 









The models were estimated with robust standard errors to adjust for any 
heteroskedasticity, and a correlation matrix, collinearity diagnostic index, and a variance 
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inflation factor (VIF) test were all estimated to test for this. All results were well below 
concerning thresholds.  
Results 
Before any models were estimated, summary statistics were calculated on the dataset 
(Table 1.1). The range of randomized costs that producers saw while taking the survey 
and that were generated by Qualtrics within preset limitations was between $2,057 and 
$47,428. Of producers who responded to the survey, 40.2% already utilized some sort 
of on-farm carcass disposal capabilities, and the average farm mortality rate was 
4.15%. The majority of respondents considered themselves larger operations, as only 
26.7% of producers had 149,999 birds or less, and only 11.3% of surveyed producers 
had an ownership share of 81% or more in their operation. A quarter of producers 
(24.6%) believed the probability of an FAD affecting their individual operation was 5% or 
less, meaning there would not be an FAD outbreak that would affect their farm within 
the next 25 years. Lastly, of the producers who completed the survey, 47.6% would be 
willing to adopt additional on-farm carcass disposal capabilities, showing initially that 
there is indeed some level of willingness to expand on-farm disposal capacity among 
poultry producers who participated in the survey. 
To gain a base estimate for producers’ WTP for on-farm carcass disposal, a 
probit model was estimated that only included the BioCost variable, which was the costs 
presented for the OOHB question (Table 1.2 & 1.3). A higher cost corresponded with a 
greater likelihood of a producer claiming they would adopt new or additional on-farm 
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carcass disposal methods; however, this result was not statistically significant. With only 
including the cost in the model, the average willingness to pay was $29,609. 
The probit model (Table 1.4 & 1.5) with the additional variables, Onsite, 
DeathLoss, Small, Midwest, FullOwn, and ProbOfDisease was estimated but was 
insignificant due to the limited sample size, which lead to omitted variable biases. 
However, because of the OOHB question, upper and lower bounds were established for 
the respondents’ WTP, thus allowing a shift from the probit model to an interval 
regression model (Bateman et al., 2004; Lopez-Feldman, 2012).  
Interval Regression Results 
Based on the interval regression model (Table 1.6), several variables that were 
collected from the survey pertaining to the adoption of on-farm disposal methods were 
significant and could serve as estimators of the larger population of poultry producers. 
Producers who already have on-farm carcass disposal capabilities in place are less 
likely to be willing to adopt, which is economical given prior investments. Specifically, 
these producer’s WTP was $490 less, on average. Although not statistically significant, 
the interval regression results also showed that producers who have high mortality rates 
on their farms are more willing to adopt on-farm carcass disposal methods. An 
explanation for this response can be that operations with higher mortality could be faced 
with a larger predicament if under a movement restriction due to a disease outbreak and 
if they do not have on-farm disposal capabilities. Size of farm seemed to also have a 
statistically significant impact on willingness to adopt. Smaller farms, farms with 149,999 
birds or less, were less willing to adopt as well, which could be contributed to the 
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weaker link public good mindset that sometimes surrounds biosecurity, or it could be 
that smaller farms have less capital and disposable income to spend implementing such 
on-farm measures. These smaller producers’ WTP was $19,549 less, on average.  
 A surprising finding that did not coincide with prior expectations, was related to 
producers who were considered to have full ownership of their operation. The model 
showed that these owners were less likely to invest by an average of $37,490. A theory 
as to why this result was substantial could be that, as full owners of the poultry 
operation, the financial burden of implementing new biosecurity procedures would fall 
solely on their shoulders, whereas, for a producer who may share ownership of a 
poultry operation, they could perceive the costs of new biosecurity adoption could be 
shared, thus reducing the financial burden. Lastly, producers who had a disease 
probability of 1 to 5% were also less likely to adopt. These producers believe that an 
FAD outbreak will not affect their individual operation within the next 25 years. 
Therefore, they have a lower WTP for additional biosecurity implementation like on-farm 
carcass disposal because the current costs of implementation are not recuperated by 
the discounted future benefits that this type of biosecurity would provide. On average, 
these producers had a WTP of $36,460 less. 
Overall, poultry producers who participated in the survey have a statistically 
significant mean WTP to implement on-farm carcass disposal methods of $15,651. This 
indicates that there is a market for adopting biosecurity practices among poultry 
producers who participated in the survey, which could translate to a larger majority of 
poultry producers as a whole.  If this did indicate some willingness to adopt by poultry 
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producers at large, it could signal the importance of disposal capacity and biosecurity 
practices in addressing potential financial risks associated with disease exposure. 
Conclusions 
In recent years, poultry consumption has surpassed red meat consumption for the first 
time in decades. Research on the healthfulness of poultry and lower prices have been 
identified as contributing factors to the rise in poultry popularity. With such high 
consumer demand, it is vital for producers to protect the poultry food supply, through 
ways such as biosecurity at the farm-level. Researchers have discussed the moral 
hazard associated with biosecurity and its weaker-link public good notability. A farming 
community’s biosecurity is only as good as the smallest farm’s or the lowest amount of 
biosecurity efforts in place. It is easy for a producer to piggyback off of other producers’ 
biosecurity implementation in hopes that they stop a disease outbreak, however, the 
issue arises when their farm is not protected, they contract an FAD, and then the 
surrounding farms, community, and economy are damaged by no fault of their own. 
Biosecurity procedures before, during, and after a livestock disease outbreak are 
important, and their awareness and implementation cannot be understated. 
Most people think of preventative measures when the topic of biosecurity arises, 
however, there is an immense amount of biosecurity practices and methods that are 
vital after or when an FAD outbreak occurs. This study looked at a group of poultry 
producers’ WTP for on-farm carcass disposal methods by analyzing their responses to 
a survey. The survey consisted of questions relating to individual operation 
characteristics (size, location, mortality rate, ownership, etc.) and current biosecurity 
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procedures. The producers who participated in the survey were also provided with a 
one and one-half bound (OOHB) dichotomous choice question relating to their 
willingness to implement on-farm carcass disposal practices at randomized cost levels 
(Bateman et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2018). Using select variables from the survey, 
along with the answers to the OOHB question, an interval regression model was 
formulated to estimate the mean WTP for the group of poultry producers that 
participated in the study.  
Statistically significant results showed that small producers, who fully own their 
poultry operations, that already possess some sort of on-farm carcass disposal 
capabilities, and who believed no FAD would affect their operation within the next 25 
years, had a lower WTP for on-farm carcass disposal methods. Taking into 
consideration those variables that significantly lowered a producer’s willingness to 
adopt, the overall mean WTP for the poultry producers who participated in the survey 
was $15,651. This study aimed to understand producers and create awareness 
pertaining to FADs and carcass disposal during a disease outbreak, while also 
identifying specific poultry farm characteristics and factors that impact their willingness 
to adopt such practices. Policy writers can use this information when creating or 
amending livestock disease management legislation in the future, and it will allow them 
to see what factors impact and contribute to these types of financial decisions for poultry 
producers.  
  To improve and extend this study in the future, a larger sample size would allow 
stronger predictions to be made for the larger majority of poultry producers. A study in 
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connection to this one, surveyed feedlot operators to estimate their WTP to adopt 
feedlot lot on-farm carcass disposal methods. However, expanding into other animal 
proteins, such as dairy or pork, would allow for a more rounded WTP estimation for the 













Livestock disease management is crucial for producers. However, the government 
holds the responsibility to ensure that proper management is carried out because 
livestock diseases not only affect animals and producers, they also impact public 
welfare and the economy as a whole. The largest animal health event on record in the 
United States was an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in 2014, and it cost 
U.S. taxpayers approximately $950 million to stop, control, and eradicate the disease. A 
main duty the U.S. government has in eradicating a disease is through the depopulation 
of infected or potentially infected animals. In order for this to happen legally however, 
producers must be paid fair market compensation for the animal. Livestock indemnity 
has been covered vastly throughout literature from the policy level, yet research is 
lacking at the producer level, particularly on producers’ preferences regarding 
indemnity. Through a ranked-ordered probit model, producers’ rankings of four different 
types of indemnity are analyzed. The results indicate heterogeneity in preference 
rankings and provide policymakers with insightful information on producers’ opinions on 
compensation after a disease outbreak and allow legislators to consider producers’ 
preferences when updating or creating new policies regarding livestock disease 
management in the future. 
Introduction 
Livestock disease management can be difficult to implement, regulate, and enforce, yet 
it is a highly essential task that the U.S. government must address. Its significance is 
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due to the fact that livestock diseases not only affect animals, but also impact 
producers, public welfare, and the economy as a whole (Sumner et al., 2005). The 
largest animal health event in U.S. history was the outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza (HPAI) in December of 2014. The outbreak lasted until June of 2015 and cost 
the U.S. government approximately $950 million (USDA-APHIS-VS 2016). The most 
recent outbreak of Virulent Newcastle Disease (VND), which, like HPAI, affects poultry 
and other bird species, was confirmed on May 18, 2018 (Hayden and Cole, 2018). The 
largest case of VND in the United States, or what was then referred to as Exotic 
Newcastle Disease (END), started in 2002 and lasted until 2003, costing U.S. taxpayers 
roughly $180 million in government funds (USDA-ARS 2016). Aside from costing the 
United States money and resources to detect, eradicate, and compensate producers, 
livestock diseases also influence other areas of the economy such as international trade 
and general overall commodity prices. For example, Bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE), commonly known as “mad cow disease,” was first confirmed in the United States 
in Washington State on December 23, 2003 and spurred multiple countries to ban U.S. 
beef imports, which in turn, forced domestic beef prices to plummet (Jin, Skripnitchenko, 
and Koo, 2004). Even though U.S. consumers reaped the benefit of cheaper domestic 
beef prices, it was reported that producers experienced approximately 20 percent 
losses in gross revenue due to the price decline (Sumner et al., 2005). 
Livestock disease management cannot be solely left up to the producer because 
of the public good effect is symbolizes. The public benefits outweigh the private benefits 
in disease management because the producers themselves are responsible for 
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implementing prevention and biosecurity measures at their own private costs, while the 
public reaps the benefits of disease outbreaks not occurring. Due to this reason, 
producers tend to underinvest in preventative disease measures because they do not 
see the private incentive for them to do so (Sumner et al., 2005). As a result, 
government intervention is necessary for effective livestock disease management. It is 
their responsibility to ensure producers are implementing ex-ante and ex-post disease 
measures through the balancing of public benefits and private costs (Gramig, Horan, 
and Wolf, 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Muhammad and Jones, 2008). One way the 
government is currently attempting to assist in livestock disease management is through 
compensation after an outbreak occurs, which typically includes the direct costs 
associated with eradicating the disease and the value of the livestock that is 
depopulated. This study focuses on producers’ views of current indemnity policy and 
possible changes to the ways indemnity could be handled in the future. Variations in 
producers’ viewpoints will also be analyzed based on factors such as individual 
perception of a disease outbreak occurring, size of operation, and type of livestock 
raised. This analysis and findings will be beneficial to policy makers as they are trying to 






When a livestock disease is identified or reported in a herd or flock, by law, the U.S. 
government has the responsibility to step in and take action. Title 7 of the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulations under the Animal Health Protection Chapter 109 § 8301 states, 
“Congress finds that the prevention, detection, control, and eradication of diseases and 
pests of animals are essential to protect animal health, the health and welfare of the 
people of the United States, the economic interest of the livestock and related industries 
of the United States, [and] the environment…” (U.S. Government, 2012, p. 7). 
Detection, control, and eradication of disease pests, 7 C.F.R. § 8303 (2012) goes on to 
state that “the Secretary [United States Secretary of Agriculture] may carry out 
operations and measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of 
livestock.” However, livestock diseases are eradicated by depopulating the diseased 
animals and others that have the potential to become infected. The 5th Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution states “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation” (U.S. Government, 1992). Because these animals are privately 
owned by individual producers and are being seized by the government for the good of 
the public, the producers must be paid compensation, as it is written. This 
compensation is also known as indemnity (Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Kuchler and 
Hamm, 2000; Muhammad and Jones, 2008; Ott, 2005).  
The agency within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that is 
responsible for carrying out the actions to detect, control, and eradicate livestock 
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diseases is the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) (Grannis and 
Bruch, 2005; Kuchler and Hamm, 2000). The agency is in charge of calculating 
indemnity payment amounts for the diseased animals. Cooperative control and 
eradication of livestock or poultry diseases, 9 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2000) states that “each 
eligible animal will be appraised to determine its fair market value. The indemnity shall 
be the appraised value, minus the salvage value.” In other words, the indemnity 
payment the producer will receive is the APHIS appraised fair market value less any 
other compensation the producer receives for the deceased animals such as insurance 
payouts or other disaster assistance (Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch, 2005; Ott, 
2005). Compensating producers fair market value for diseased animals seems 
reasonable, however the government wants producers to see this compensation as an 
incentive to report disease early so it can be stopped with minimal damage, and as an 
incentive to implement biosecurity at the farm level to prevent the introduction of 
disease. Some worry that the current uniform methods of indemnity may be creating 
perverse incentives for producers to produce diseased animals and/or to not report 
disease altogether because indemnity only covers the direct cost of the depopulated 
animal leaving many indirect costs of a disease outbreak up to the producer (Gramig et 
al., 2005, 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Kuchler and Hamm, 2000; OECD, 2017).  
This ordeal is thoroughly discussed in the literature. 
The Challenge 
As previously discussed, as policy makers consider changes to the current way 
indemnity is handled, they must recognize producers’ private costs and benefits. An 
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issue with current indemnity is that it does not cover indirect costs of a disease 
outbreak. These “consequential losses” can include, but are not limited to, the cost of 
feed for animals awaiting depopulation, loss in reproductive or genetically superior 
stock, and loss of income due to downtime and immobility as a result of quarantines 
(Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch, 2005; Ott, 2005; USDA-APHIS 2017). From an 
outsider’s perspective, the largest risk to the producer seems to be the loss of the actual 
animal during a disease outbreak, however, that may not be the case in all situations. In 
some instances, these indirect costs have the potential to create substantial burdens for 
producers. As a result, producers who recognize the damaging effects the disease 
eradication process can have on their individual business, may rethink reporting the 
disease in the first place and either depopulating themselves or proceeding to take the 
livestock to slaughter, which can have grave implications due to the rapid transmission 
capabilities of diseases. Therefore, the current form of indemnity could be 
counterproductive as it could be doing the exact opposite of what indemnity is supposed 
to. It further exacerbates the outbreak of disease instead of identifying it early and 
controlling it (Gramig et al., 2005).  
 On the other hand, if policy makers make indemnity payouts too large, this can 
create perverse incentives for producers to produce more diseased animals and at the 
least, discourage producers from implementing preventative biosecurity measures at 
the farm level (Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2017). This idea is what many in the 
literature call the “moral hazard” of government indemnity for livestock disease (Gramig 
et al., 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Muhammad and Jones, 2008). A study 
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published by Muhammad and Jones (2008), mathematically illustrated this indirect 
effect of higher indemnity. They showed that a rise in the number of diseased animals 
being reported to APHIS is due to higher compensation, which can lead to the reduction 
of biosecurity adoption, thus increasing the number of diseased animals overall. Some 
researchers go as far to say that based on their own research conclusions, even fair 
market value for diseased livestock is too high and by compensating producers at that 
rate is damaging producers’ incentives to invest in biosecurity (Fraser, 2016; Hennessy 
and Wang, 2010). Kuchler and Hamm (2000) explain that in the short run, if reports of 
diseases are decreasing and relative indemnities are increasing or remaining constant, 
then diseased animals must be becoming harder to find, thus the indemnity program is 
working. However, this only works if there is an incentive to actually look for infected 
animals. Policy makers must understand producer’s private incentives when planning 
livestock disease indemnity programs. The challenge has been covered greatly 
throughout the literature, and many of the researchers also offer recommendations or 
solutions to improve current policy.  
Possible Solutions 
One solution to the perverse incentives surrounding government indemnity is a policy 
that shifts more of the risk of livestock disease to the producer (Gramig et al., 2009; 
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2017). Instead of the government being responsible 
for paying compensation for diseased and depopulated animals, a new policy could 
include discounted indemnity rates for already diseased animals and producers 
receiving no indemnity payment at all for dead animals. This shifts some of the risk to 
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the producer and greatly encourages early reporting of disease because producers will 
essentially be losing more money the longer they wait to report.  In conjunction, the idea 
also creates the necessary incentive for producers to implement biosecurity because 
there is no longer a motivation to produce diseased animals (Gramig et al., 2009; 
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2017). A policy that shifts the risks of disease to the 
producer while also encouraging both early reporting and biosecurity implementation 
simultaneously, is how an efficient livestock disease indemnity program should work. By 
preventing disease introduction and eradicating disease occurrences promptly, the 
repercussions of an outbreak will minimally impact producers, livestock, the public, the 
environment, and the overall economy, which is indeed the goal of livestock disease 
management. 
 A second consideration that could potentially alleviate some of the downside risk 
of current livestock indemnity policy in the United States is livestock insurance. If 
producers took out private insurance policies on their livestock, then the consequential 
losses of a disease outbreak that are not assured under government indemnity could 
then be covered by the insurance company (Grannis and Bruch, 2005). The producer 
would also still be encouraged to practice good biosecurity as it would more than likely 
be a requirement by the insurance agency because it signifies the producer is doing 
everything in his or her own power to keep the herd or flock healthy.  The insurance 
company may even offer discounted premiums to producers for implementing such 
disease prevention measures (Ott, 2005). It has also been suggested that government 
livestock indemnity eligibility could be tied to insurance program participation as it 
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suggests producers who are insured are already adhering to good biosecurity practices 
(Grannis and Bruch, 2005). However, there is a reason why livestock insurance is not 
as prevalent or popular as other insurance programs such as crop insurance. Livestock 
disease insurance comes with high risk and large payouts if an outbreak were to occur, 
which companies may not want to undertake. Producers also may not want to make the 
business decision to pay the high premiums it would involve for the insurance company 
to offer that type of expensive coverage (Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Ott, 2005). There 
are professional opinions analyzing the pros and cons of livestock disease insurance, 
however, the results of this study will help contribute to a more complete understanding 
of producer opinions on government indemnity, which will be valuable to U.S. policy 
makers who could be updating current livestock disease policy and writing new 
legislation in the future. 
Data 
A survey was sent out in May of 2017 to feedlot owners through a popular cattle 
producer magazine, Feedlot Magazine, (Appendix B), and two follow-up emails were 
sent out to producers after the initial survey dispersal. From the survey data, a total of 
139 respondents were represented. The survey consisted of questions aimed toward 
producers’ current on-farm carcass disposal methods and their views on current 
government indemnity policy. Question 7 on the feedlot survey provided four different 
indemnity policies and asked producers to rank the choices in order of preference with 
‘1’ being most preferred and ‘4’ being the least preferred. The four options were 
‘Indemnity equal to current market value of animal if sold on day of claim,’ ‘Indemnity 
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equal to current market value or cost to raise animal, whichever is the highest but 
requires feedlots sharing farm receipts,’ ‘Indemnity funds available based upon 
evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity practices being in place through feedlot inspection,’ 
and ‘Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums 
are subsidized by the government.’ By analyzing how producers ranked these indemnity 
options, the results can prove valuable in creating or modifying current policy by 




When considering policies that are intended to benefit producers such as government 
compensation after a livestock disease outbreak, it is vital to understand how producers 
make decisions in the presence of risk. Producers are said to be risk averse (Mulwa et 
al., 2017). However, they are also profit maximizers because a farm is a business, and 
if that business is not profitable, it cannot persist (Nicholson and Snyder, 2012). 
Therefore, the producer must weigh the odds of risk and profit when making cost 
decisions. Other factors are also included in this decision-making process, and through 
this study, the specific demographics and variables that impact a producer’s perception 




A ranked-order probit model will be used to estimate the impacts specific independent 
variables collected from the survey data have on ranked-order dependent variables. 
First, summary statistics and tabulations of the data will be computed and analyzed to 
understand the overall survey and test for the presence of perfect collinearity. Next, an 
ordered probit model will allow conclusions to be drawn about what factors determine 
the ranking order of the four indemnity options. Such a model is derived from an 
underlying latent variable model with thresholds, or cuts-offs, creating the bounds for 
the four rankings. These thresholds are necessary for the regression because the 
rankings 1, 2, 3, and 4 are ordinal, but the actual numbers themselves do not mean 
anything (Chiburis and Lokshin, 2007; Gutiérrez et al., 2016; Katchova, 2013a; P. 
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 ≤ τ1
2,  if τ2 ≥ yi
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3,  if τ3 ≥ yi
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where y* is unobserved, β represents the coefficients on variables x, τ are the unknown 
thresholds or cut off points, and ε is the error term that is normally distributed for the 
probit model.  The derivation process to get to the maximum likelihood distribution 
function (11) is shown in equation (10) (Wooldridge, 2001). 
 P(y=1) = P(y*≤ τ1) = P( βx+ε ≤τ1) = Φ(τ1-βx) (10) 
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P(y=2) = P(τ2 ≥ yi
*> τ1) = P( τ2 ≥ βx+ε > τ1) = Φ(τ2-βx)-Φ(τ1-βx) 
P(y=3) = P(τ3 ≥ yi
* > τ2) = P( τ3 ≥ βx+ε > τ2) = Φ(τ3-βx)-Φ(τ2-βx) 
P(y=4) =P(y *> τ3) = P( βx+ε > τ3) = Φ[1-(τ3-βx)] 












Similar to Chapter 1, the log-likelihood function (12) will allow the factors that determine 













The latent variable model that will be used for this analysis will look very similar to the 
model used in Chapter 1 equation (6). However, instead of estimating the likelihood to 
adopt, in this model, the dependent variable (y) will be the likelihood of ranking the four 
indemnity options; see equation (13). A separate model for each indemnity option will 
be estimated. Thus, the factors or variables that contribute to producer’s various 
rankings of the polices can be analyzed. 
 



















where Indemnity Policy Ranking is the ordinal dependent variable between 1 and 4 with 
1 being “most preferred” indemnity choice and 4 being “least preferred”; Midwest 
represents a series of binary variables describing the region in which the operation is 
located in the U.S.; FullOwn represents a series of binary variables describing the 
ownership of the operation with 1 representing the producer’s share of ownership being 
greater than or equal to 81 percent and 0 being less than or equal to 80 percent. Small 
represents a series of binary variables describing the size of the operation with 1 being 
less than or equal to 1,999 head and 0 being greater than or equal to 2,000 head; 
ProbOfDisease represents a series of binary variables describing the producer’s 
individual perception of disease risk; DeathLoss represents the farm’s routine livestock 
mortality rate; and 𝜀 represents the error term for the model. 
All computations and calculations for this ordered probit regression will be 
estimated in Stata (Table 2.2).  As already stated, the magnitude of the regression 
coefficients will not mean anything due to different scale factors, however the sign of the 
coefficients can be interpreted as a positive or negative effect on the dependent 
variable. By calculating the marginal effects (Table 2.3 - 2.6), the coefficients then 
represent a numerical percentage of impact on the dependent variable and can be 
interpreted as a “one unit increase in variable x is either more likely or less likely to be a 
specific y (ranked dependent variable)” for continuous variables and “the likelihood of 
variable x being present (the 1) compared to the excluded variable (the 0)” for binary 
variables (Katchova, 2013b).    
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The ordered probit model was ran with robust standard errors to adjust for 
potential heteroskedasticity. With this type of ordered regression, it is also imperative to 
test and confirm that no perfect collinearity is present within the model. A correlation 
matrix, variance inflation factor (VIF) test, and condition index number were all 
computed and indicated that no perfect collinearity was occurring in the model. 
Results 
Analyzing the survey data allows essential foreknowledge to be gained before any 
regressions are calculated or models are estimated. According to the summary statistics 
(Table 2.1) of all 64 observations (number of respondents who answered the indemnity 
question) utilized in the study, indemnity equal to current market value was ranked 
lower more often concluding that overall, it was the most preferred method of indemnity 
among the producers who were surveyed. On average, 29.5% of those producers fully 
owned their operation (ownership greater than or equal to 81%); 30.2% were small 
farms (less than or equal to 1,999 head); 50.0% used on-farm carcass disposal 
methods; the average mortality rate, or death rate, was 1.9%; 45.5% of surveyed 
producers believed the probability of animal disease outbreak affecting their operation 
was between 1 and 5%; and 33.4% of producers believed an outbreak was essentially 
not going to happen in the near or medium future (probability less than or equal to 1%). 
 Figure 2.1 displays an illustration of the tabulations for each of the four indemnity 
policies. Coinciding with the summary statistics, the greatest number of producers 
(54.7%) selected market value as their most preferred indemnity policy. Focusing on 
that majority, 40% of those ranked subsidized insurance as their second choice, and 
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57.1% of those producers ranked the policy linked to cost raising of animal upon sharing 
farm receipts as their third choice, leaving indemnity linked to biosecurity efforts as the 
least preferred policy.  Thus, before taking any other variables into consideration, on 
average, producer’s rankings of the four indemnity policies are as follows starting with 
the most preferred to the least preferred: 
(1) Indemnity equal to current market value of animal if sold on day of claim 
(2) Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums 
are subsidized by the government 
(3) Indemnity equal to current market value or cost to raise animal, whichever is the 
highest but requires feedlots sharing farm receipts 
(4) Indemnity funds available based upon evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity 
practices being in place through feedlot inspection 
Small Feedlots 
According to the ordered probit regression (Table 2.2), small feedlots, those with 1,999 
head or less, are more likely to rank the indemnity policy pertaining to biosecurity efforts 
higher, meaning they prefer it less over other policies because a higher ranking 
corresponds with a less preferred choice in this model. The marginal effects for this 
indemnity policy (Table 2.5) estimated that small producers are 13.9% less likely to rank 
biosecurity efforts as their most preferred indemnity policy and 23.2% more likely to 
rank it as their least preferred choice. These results were expected as smaller farms 
have less disposable income to spend on additional or advanced biosecurity practices 
compared to larger farms who probably already have such biosecurity in place or have 
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the financial means to implement such measures. This result can help formulate new or 
changing indemnity policies in the future. For example, if indemnity legislation were to 
change and become linked to biosecurity efforts, it may be more economical to have 
various levels of biosecurity expectations for the varying farm sizes across the United 
States.  A policy like this could benefit all farms in regard to animal disease prevention, 
and it would also take into consideration the smaller producers who do not have as 
much disposable income to spend on implementing as much biosecurity as larger farms 
could. 
Perception of Disease Likelihood 
Producers who believe that the probability of a disease impacting their individual 
operation is between 1% and 5%, or that a disease will happen but only once over the 
next 25 years, are 27.3% more likely to rank the indemnity policy pertaining to 
biosecurity efforts as their least preferred choice (Table 2.5). This result makes 
economic sense. Biosecurity is a set of actions and protocols put in place to stop the 
introduction of a disease and lessen the effects of an outbreak if one were to occur 
(Muhammad and Jones, 2008). If producers perceive that there is not an impending 
threat of disease to their individual farm, they are likely less concerned with 
implementing biosecurity. Those same producers were estimated to be 8.9% less likely 
to rank biosecurity efforts as their second policy choice, which coincides with the 
tabulations of the variable because 41.9% of producers whose probability of disease 
was between 1 and 5% ranked subsidized insurance as their second choice. 
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The same producers who believe that a disease outbreak will occur, but not 
anytime soon, were 10.4% more likely to rank subsidized insurance as their most 
preferred indemnity policy choice, 12.6% more likely to rank it as their second choice, 
and 19.9% less likely to rank it as their least preferred method of receiving indemnity 
(Table 2.6).  Based on these results, producers whose probability of impending disease 
is low, would rather have their indemnity payments tied to the government subsidizing 
premiums for insurance on their livestock rather than implementing biosecurity 
measures on their own. 
Conclusions 
Livestock indemnity is mandated by the government, but it is essential for producers 
during a livestock disease outbreak. Currently, indemnity compensation for a diseased 
or depopulated animal is paid based on the fair market value of the animal as estimated 
by AHPIS (Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch, 2005; Ott, 2005). However, 
researchers have identified potential flaws with this current indemnity policy, such as 
possibly incentivizing the production of diseased animals and/or the disincentive to 
report an animal disease or implement preventative biosecurity measures altogether. 
Some possible solutions to these challenges that have been heavily discussed within 
the literature include livestock insurance and shifting more of the risk of a livestock 
disease to the producer by offering no compensation for dead animals and discounted 
compensation for already diseased animals. However, something that has not been 
researched as intently are producers’ preferences regarding current livestock indemnity 
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policy in the United States, which is why this study is valuable. Through survey 
responses, producers’ rankings of four different indemnity polices were analyzed.  
A majority of producers’ most preferred method of indemnity was the current 
policy of fair market value. However, if policy writers were to take into consideration the 
issues that have been realized regarding this current policy and amend current livestock 
indemnity legislation, the indemnity policy relating to livestock insurance with the 
government subsidizing the premiums was the next best option, according to the 
majority of producers who participated in the survey. 46% of all producers surveyed had 
a very low perception of disease outbreak, meaning they did not think that an animal 
disease would not impact their own operation within the next 25 years. Statistically 
significant results showed that these producers were especially fond of the subsidized 
insurance indemnity policy.  Of those same producers, a majority chose indemnity 
linked to “best-effort” biosecurity practices as their least preferred choice. Significant 
results concluded that small producers, those with less than or equal to 1,999 head, 
also ranked the policy linked to biosecurity as their least favorite.   
From this study, it was determined that producers prefer the current method of 
indemnity compensation after a livestock disease outbreak. However, if legislators were 
to amend the policy based on issues arising due to incentives or disincentives the 
current methods were creating, producers favor an indemnity policy tied to livestock 
insurance with government subsidized premiums, and they do not like the idea of 
indemnity compensation being linked to biosecurity practices although a policy with 
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various levels of biosecurity expectations based on varying farm sizes might change 
their preferences.   
 There was a main limitation in this study. The amount of observations limited the 
number of variables that could be included in the model and inhibited a greater amount 
of statistical significance within the results. This study could be strengthened by having 
broader survey response rates. This could be accomplished by collecting survey 
responses from other than just feedlot producers. Responses from producers of other 
animal proteins, such as poultry, swine, or dairy, would greatly strengthen the study and 
allow for more well-rounded conclusions to be drawn and recommended to legislators 
regarding livestock indemnity policy in the United States. However, limitations could 
also exist in such an all-encompassing model because livestock producers of varying 
proteins have different motives for ranking policies specific ways. These differences 





The largest animal health event in U.S. history was an outbreak of Highly Pathenogenic 
Avian Influenza in 2014, and it cost U.S. taxpayers over $950 million for the government 
to stop and eradicate the disease (USDA-APHIS-VS 2016). When a foreign animal 
disease (FAD) outbreak occurs, it affects so many more facets of life than just the 
animals and producers. Consumers are impacted by the price changes at the grocery 
store when the food supply gets interrupted. If the excessive carcass production due to 
disease and depopulation is not handled properly, the environment suffers. Producers 
lose profits due to downtime in business operations and decreased prices. Government 
officials at organizations like the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
have to use additional resources to stop, control, and eradicate the FAD, and those 
financial resources come from U.S. taxpayers. As a result of each of these, livestock 
disease management is extremely important, and the responsibility to ensure that it is 
carried out efficiently and effectively, falls on both the producer and the government.  
These studies looked at two specific types of livestock disease management 
post-FAD outbreak: on-farm carcass disposal and indemnity. The ability to dispose of 
livestock carcasses onsite during an FAD outbreak is highly favored and sought after by 
the government because for farms who normally carry their routine mortality offsite to a 
renderer or landfill, that may no longer be an option due to movement restrictions. 
These restrictions are set forth by APHIS and impact the farms that may fall within a 
certain specified outbreak zone (Hawkins et al., 2017; USDA-APHIS-VS 2017). 
Indemnity, which is the compensation producers receive when the government has to 
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come in and depopulate animals due to an FAD, plays a vital role in livestock disease 
management. The current indemnity policy in the United States is an APHIS approved 
fair market value for the depopulated animal (Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch, 
2005; Ott, 2005). However, researchers have recently identified some potential issues 
with this current method such as incentivizing the production of diseased animals or 
disincentivizing producers form either reporting an FAD or implementing preventative 
biosecurity measures altogether. If these concerns became realized in a quantifiable 
way and legislators want to amend the current policy, it will be beneficial to know what 
policies producers themselves prefer, and what influences those preferences. 
 Results showed that of all the poultry producers who participated in the survey, 
the mean WTP to adopt on-farm carcass disposal capabilities was $15,651. 
Characteristics such as size, ownership percentage, current biosecurity methods, and 
disease perception significantly contributed to estimating their WTP. For the second 
study, feedlot operators preferred the indemnity policy that is currently in place, which is 
fair market value for the animal. However, the second favored option was livestock 
insurance with premiums subsidized by the government, and the least preferred method 
was an indemnity policy tied to a farm’s biosecurity efforts. Similar to the first study, 
characteristics such as size and disease perception had a significant impact on policy 
selection. 
 The information that both of these studies provide can be invaluable to 
government officials and policy writers in regard to livestock disease management. In 
order to efficiently control the repercussions of an FAD outbreak, legislators may want 
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to know how to incentivize producers to adopt on-farm carcass disposal methods to 
minimize community and environmental damage that could be caused due to 
transportation restrictions. By knowing the estimated WTP for the producers surveyed, it 
allows greater understanding of cost thresholds and can improve analyses to determine 
if something such as a subsidy program, could be implemented for producers to adopt 
these biosecurity measures. Likewise, with the current indemnity policy concerns that 
have been identified by researchers, policy writers and animal health officials may want 
to amend the form in which current indemnity is handled. By knowing what producers 
actually prefer and what factors contribute to those preferences, a more well-rounded, 
efficient policy can be created. 
 Limitations to these studies included sample size and limited classification of 
each group. By increasing the amount of survey responses, stronger, more significant 
predictions can be made for each group. Moreover, broadening both studies to include 
other animal protein classifications like dairy and pork, could allow for such estimations 
to be made for the overall livestock industry. Although, such an all-encompassing model 
may be difficult to produce, as different livestock groups have unique and varied 
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Figure 1.2 Map of States Represented in “Midwest” Variable  
64 
 
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of Select Poultry Producer Survey Responses 
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bio Q 1 if will adopt; 0 otherwise 21 0.476 0.512 0 1 
       
Bio Cost1 Cost of adoption that 
producer was presented 
53 24.703 13.903 2.057 47.428 
       
Onsite Current onsite carcass 
disposal % 
53 40.189 49.009 0 100 
       
Death Loss Operation’s livestock 
mortality rate 
23 4.150 2.775 0 10 
       
Small 1 if  149,999 birds; 0 
otherwise 
15 0.267 0.458 0 1 
       
Midwest 1 if operation located in 
Midwest3; 0 otherwise  
53 0.057 0.233 0 1 
       
Full Own 1 if ownership of operation 
is  81%; 0 otherwise 
53 0.113 0.320 0 1 
       
Prob 1 or Less Producer perception of 
FAD2 outbreak affecting 
individual operation once 
in next 100 years 
53 0.057 0.233 0 1 
       
Prob 1 to 5 Producer perception of 
FAD2 outbreak affecting 
individual operation once 
in next 25 years 
53 0.189 0.395 0 1 
1 In thousandths of dollars 
2 Foreign Animal Disease 






Table 1.2 Simplified Probit Model Results of Producer Willingness to Adopt 
Additional Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
BioCost 0.009 0.019 0.49 0.624 -0.028 0.047 
Constant -0.281 0.526 -0.53 0.594 -1.312 0.750 
       
Willingness 
to Pay 
29.609 31.81 0.93 0.352 -32.737 91.956 






Table 1.3 Simplified Probit Model Marginal Effects of Producer Willingness to 
Adopt Additional Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $) 
  Delta-method     
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 







Table 1.4 Probit Model Results of Producer Willingness to Adopt Additional 
Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $) 
  Robust     
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bio Cost 0.001 0.024 0.04 0.971 -0.047 0.049 
Onsite -0.010 0.008 -1.26 0.209 -0.027 0.006 
Death Loss 0.107 0.159 0.67 0.502 -0.205 0.418 
Small -1.316 0.887 -1.48 0.138 -3.054 0.422 
Midwest -0.252 0.990 -0.25 0.799 -2.193 1.689 
Full Own -1.654 0.814 -2.03 0.042 -3.250 -0.059 
Prob 1 or Less  (omitted)     
Prob 1 to 5 -0.277 0.836 -0.33 0.741 -1.915 1.362 
Constant 1.090 1.514 0.72 0.471 -1.877 4.058 
       
Willingness to 
Pay 
-579.886 17092.87 -0.03 0.973 -34081.3 32921.53 






Table 1.5 Probit Model Marginal Effects of Producer Willingness to Adopt 
Additional Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $) 
  Delta-method     
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bio Cost 0.000 0.008 0.04 0.971 -0.015 0.015 
Onsite -0.003 0.003 -1.18 0.240 -0.009 0.002 
Death Loss 0.033 0.049 0.68 0.495 -0.063 0.129 
Small -0.411 0.236 -1.74 0.081 -0.874 0.051 
Midwest -0.079 0.308 -0.26 0.798 -0.682 0.525 
Full Own -0.517 0.179 -2.89 0.004 -0.868 -0.166 







Table 1.6 Interval Regression Results of Producer Willingness to Adopt 
Additional Disposal Capacity 
  Robust     
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Onsite -489 147.631 -3.32 0.001 -779 -200 
Death Loss 1,145 2,195.073 0.52 0.602 -3,157 5,447 
Small -19,549 11,767.170 -1.66 0.097 -42,612 3,514 
Midwest -21,215 15,141.870 -1.40 0.161 -50,892 8,463 
Full Own -37,490 14,738.380 -2.54 0.011 -66,377 -8,603 
Prob 1 or less 20,428 18,270.090 1.12 0.264 -15,381 56,236 
Prob 1 to 5 -36,460 6,907.455 -5.28 0.000 -49,999 -22,922 
Constant 83,304 . . . . . 
       
/lnsigma 10 0.546 17.41 0.000 8 11 
       
sigma 13,489 7,369.740 4,622.92 39,358.230 721 1,203 
 
            
Willingness to 
Pay 
15,651 8,061.346 1.94 0.052 -149 31,451 






Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Select Feedlot Operator Survey Responses 
Variables Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market Value Indemnity as fair market value 64 1.766 1.004 1 4 
       
Farm Receipts Indemnity as cost of raising 
animal using farm receipts 
64 2.703 1.079 1 4 
       
Biosecurity Indemnity based on “best-
effort” biosecurity practices 
64 2.875 1.062 1 4 
       
Subsidy Indemnity tied to livestock 
insurance with government 
paid subsidies 
64 2.656 1.011 1 4 
       
Midwest 1 if operation located in 
Midwest2; 0 otherwise 
139 0.331 0.472 0 1 
       
Full Own 1 if ownership of operation is 
 81%; 0 otherwise 
139 0.295 0.458 0 1 
       
Small 1 if  1,999 head; 0 otherwise 139 0.302 0.461 0 1 
       
Onsite Current onsite carcass 
disposal % 
100 49.96 47.924 0 100 
       
Death Loss Operation’s livestock mortality 
rate 
82 1.926 1.461 0.03 10 
       
Prob 1 or Less Producer perception of FAD1 
outbreak affecting individual 
operation once in next 100 
years 
77 0.338 0.476 0 1 
       
Prob1 to 5% Producer perception of FAD1 
outbreak affecting individual 
operation once in next 25 
years 
77 0.455 0.501 0 1 
1 Foreign Animal Disease 



































Producer Indemnity Policy Preferences
IndemSubsidy IndemBiosecurity IndemFarmReceipt IndemMarketValue
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Table 2.2 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Results for Feedlot Operator 
Indemnity Policy Preferences 
 









Midwest 0.102 -0.152 -0.003 0.043  
(0.351) (0.320) (0.376) (0.248) 
Full Own -0.304 0.251 -0.282 0.289  
(0.317) (0.338) (0.332) (0.309) 
Small -0.183 0.0146 0.637** -0.414  
(0.334) (0.381) (0.313) (0.340) 
Onsite 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0  
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Death Loss 0.0597 0.093 -0.074 -0.076  
(0.120) (0.152) (0.0694) (0.0625) 
Prob 1 or less -0.031 0.029 0.218 -0.298  
(0.470) (0.406) (0.433) (0.359) 
Prob 1 to 5% -0.382 0.148 0.783* -0.592*  
(0.408) (0.334) (0.410) (0.326) 
Constant cut1 -0.170 -0.842** -0.466 -1.766***  
(0.600) (0.418) (0.634) (0.430) 
Constant cut2 0.500 -0.072 0.081 -0.623  
(0.611) (0.420) (0.629) (0.422) 
Constant cut3 1.092* 0.690 1.057* 0.087  
(0.615) (0.440) (0.634) (0.423)  
    
Observations 64 64 64 64 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 2.3 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for 
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity 
as Market Value 
Variables   Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
Midwest  -0.040 0.010 0.014 0.016 
Full Own  0.120 -0.031 -0.042 -0.047 
Small  0.073 -0.019 -0.025 -0.029 
Onsite  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Death Loss  -0.024 0.006 0.008 0.009 
Prob 1 or less  0.012 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 






Table 2.4 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for 
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity 
as Farm Receipts 
Variables   Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
Midwest  0.037 0.022 -0.007 -0.052 
Full Own  -0.062 -0.036 0.012 0.086 
Small  -0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.005 
Onsite  0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Death Loss  -0.023 -0.013 0.004 0.032 
Prob 1 or less  -0.008 -0.004 0.002 0.010 






Table 2.5 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for 
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity 
as Biosecurity Efforts 
Variables   Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
Midwest  0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Full Own  0.062 0.035 0.006 -0.103 
Small  -0.139** -0.079 -0.013 0.232** 
Onsite  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Death Loss  0.016 0.009 0.002 -0.027 
Prob 1 or less  -0.065 -0.020 0.020 0.065 
Prob 1 to 5%   -0.182 -0.089* -0.001 0.273** 






Table 2.6 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for 
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity 
as Subsidized Insurance 
Variables   Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
Midwest  -0.008 -0.009 0.003 0.014 
FullOwn  -0.056 -0.059 0.022 0.093 
Small  0.080 0.085 -0.031 -0.134 
Onsite  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DeathLoss  0.015 0.015 -0.006 -0.024 
Prob 1 or 
Less  0.043 0.071 -0.005 -0.108 







Poultry Biosecurity Survey 
 
Biosecurity is a collection of management practices designed to minimize the risk of 
disease introduction and spread. One objective of this study is to assess current and 
possible future carcass disposal methods of U.S. poultry farms. The following questions 
will refer to "your operation."  If your operation includes multiple farms or houses, please 
answer for them collectively.  
 
 
Q0 Of the birds that were raised on your operation in the past 12 months, how would 
you classify your operation? 
 Broiler (1) 
 Table Egg-layer (2) 
 Turkey (3)  
 Primary Breeder – Broiler (4) 
 Primary Breeder – Turkey (5) 
 Other (6) 
 
 
Q1 Of the birds that died on your operation in the past 12 months, what percentage 
were disposed of by the following methods? 
______ Renderer (offsite) (1) 
______ Landfill (offsite) (2) 
______ Buried (on operation property) (3) 
______ Composted (on operation property) (4) 
______ Other (please specify) (5) 
 
 
Q2 What is your best estimate of the $/bird costs associated for your operation if you 
were to use the following alternative disposal methods given volumes presented by 
typical death loss on your operation? 
______ Renderer (offsite) (1) 
______ Landfill (offsite) (2) 
______ Buried (on operation property) (3) 
______ Composted (on operation property) (4) 
 
 
Q3 What is your best estimate of typical death loss rates (%) (mortality rates) on your 
operation? 





Q4 Suppose in the next 10 years operations in your region experience a severe disease 
(e.g. highly pathogenic avian influenza) leading to governmental and industry-wide calls 
for quick changes in numerous farming practices to reduce spread and duration of the 
disease. One possible adjustment could be to entirely cease use of off-site disposal 
methods (e.g. renderer or landfill) and require sole use of on-site methods (e.g. burying 
or composting) for a period of 2 months.       
 
In advance of this situation, your operation could elect to proactively establish the ability 
to solely use on-site disposal for carcasses and be capable to handle volumes 
equivalent to 2 months of your operation’s normal death rates.      
 
Given knowledge of this situation and the implications it may present to your operation, 
if it costs $${e://Field/BioCost} in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this capacity on 
your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this investment 
within the next 3 years? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Condition: No Is Selected. Skip To: Q5.a Gov cost share option. Condition: Yes Is 
Selected. Skip To: Q4.YES. Doubling value. 
 
 
Q4.yes Suppose alternatively it costs $(2*$${e://Field/BioCost}) in one-time, fixed 
expenses to establish this capacity on your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 
months would you make this investment within the next 3 years? 
 Yes (23) 
 No (24) 
Condition: Yes Is Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease. Condition: No 
Is Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease. 
 
 
Q5.a You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time investment. 
Suppose there was a governmental cost-share program available that would 
cover ${e://Field/GovCoverPercent}% of the costs leaving the remaining 100% for you 
to cover. In this case would you proceed to make this investment within the next 3 
years?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
 
Q5.b You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time investment. 
Suppose the government established a rule that would make indemnity payments to 
those experiencing financial hardship in times of severe animal disease, would be 
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prioritized first for operations who could provide documented evidence of “best-effort” 
biosecurity practices being in place. If this policy was in place, would you proceed to 
make this investment within the next 3 years? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
 
Q6 How likely do you think it is for the U.S. poultry industry to experience a severe 
disease event resulting in your operation having to solely use on-site disposal for at 
least two months? 
 This will not occur in the next 200 years (nearly a 0% chance) (1) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 200 years (0.5% chance) (2) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 100 years (1% chance) (3) 
 This may occur 1 times in the next 50 years (2% chance) (4) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 25 years (4% chance) (5) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 10 years (10% chance) (6) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 5 years (20% chance) (7) 




Q7 Further, suppose in the severe disease situation mentioned earlier governmental 
indemnity funds were available to help offset financial hardship of operations who 
depopulated birds. How would you rank the following options for establishing indemnity 
payments (1= highly preferred, 4 = not preferred)? 
______ Indemnity equal to current market value of bird if sold on day of claim (1) 
______ Indemnity equal to current market value or cost to raise bird, whichever is the 
highest but requires producers sharing farm receipts (2) 
______ Indemnity funds available based upon evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity 
practices being in place through farm inspections (3) 
______ Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums 
are subsidized by the government (4) 
 
 
Q8 In what state does your operation primarily raise birds? 
 Drop down list of every state 
 
Q9 How many birds were raised on your total operation in the last 12 months? 
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 Less than 5,000 birds (1) 
 5,000 to 24,999 birds (2) 
 25,000 to 49,999 birds (3) 
 50,000 to 74,999 birds (4) 
 75,000 to 99,999 birds (5) 
 100,000 to 124,999 birds (6) 
 125,000 to 149,999 birds (7) 
 150,000 to 199,999 birds (8) 




Q10 Of the birds placed on your operation in the last 12 months, what percentage did 
your operation own (as opposed to someone outside the operation retaining ownership 
such as an integrator)? 
 0% (1) 
 1 to 20% (2) 
 21 to 40% (3) 
 41 to 60% (4) 
 61 to 80% (5) 
 81 to 100% (6) 
 
 




Feedlot Biosecurity Survey 
 
Biosecurity is a collection of management practices designed to minimize the risk of 
disease introduction and spread.  One objective of this study is to assess current and 
possible future carcass disposal methods of U.S. feedlots.  The following questions will 
refer to "your operation."  Please answer the questions when considering the finishing 
feedlot(s) in your operation.  If your operation includes multiple feedlots, please answer 
for them collectively.  
 
Q1 Of the cattle that died on your operation in the past 12 months, what percentage 
were disposed of by the following methods? 
______ Renderer (offsite) 
______ Landfill (offsite)  
______ Buried (on this feedlot property)  
______ Composted (on this feedlot property) 
______ Other (please specify) 
 
Q2 What is your best estimate of the $/head costs associated for your operation if you 
were to use the following alternative disposal methods given volumes presented by 
typical death loss on your operation? 
______ Renderer (offsite)  
______ Landfill (offsite) 
______ Buried (on this feedlot property) 
______ Composted (on this feedlot property) 
 
Q3 What is your best estimate of typical death loss rates (%) on your operation? 
______ Death loss rate (%) 
 
Q4 Suppose in the next 10 years operations in your region experience a severe disease 
(e.g. Foot and Mouth Disease) leading to governmental and industry-wide calls for quick 
changes in numerous feedlot practices to reduce spread and duration of the 
disease.  One possible adjustment could be to entirely cease use of off-site disposal 
methods (e.g. renderer or landfill) and require sole use of on-site methods (e.g. burying 
or composting) for a period of 2 months.        
 
In advance of this situation, your operation could elect to proactively establish the ability 
to solely use on-site disposal for carcasses and be capable to handle volumes 
equivalent to 2 months of your operation’s normal death rates.      Given knowledge of 
this situation and the implications it may present to your operation, if it costs 
$${e://Field/BioCost} in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this capacity on your 
operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this investment within 





Condition: No Is Selected. Skip To: Q5.a Gov cost share option.Condition: Yes Is 
Selected. Skip To: Q4.YES. Doubling value. 
 
Q4.YES Suppose alternatively it costs $0 in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this 
capacity on your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this 
investment within the next 3 years? 
 Yes 
 No  
Condition: Yes Is Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease.Condition: No Is 
Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease. 
 
Q5.a You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time 
investment.  Suppose there was a governmental cost-share program available that 
would cover ${e://Field/GovCoverPercent}% of the costs leaving the remaining 100% for 





Q5.b You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time 
investment.  Suppose the government established a rule that would make indemnity 
payments to those experiencing financial hardship in times of severe animal disease, 
would be prioritized first for operations who could provide documented evidence of 
“best-effort” biosecurity practices being in place.  If this policy was in place, would you 






Q6 How likely do you think it is for the U.S. feedlot industry to experience a severe 
disease event resulting in your operation having to solely use on-site disposal for at 
least two months? 
 This will not occur in the next 200 years (nearly a 0% chance) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 200 years (0.5% chance) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 100 years (1% chance) 
 This may occur 1 times in the next 50 years (2% chance)  
 This may occur 1 time in the next 25 years (4% chance)  
 This may occur 1 time in the next 10 years (10% chance) 
 This may occur 1 time in the next 5 years (20% chance) 
 This may occur 2 or more times in the next 5 years (greater than 20% chance) 
 
Q7 Further, suppose in the severe disease situation mentioned earlier governmental 
indemnity funds were available to help offset financial hardship of operations who 
depopulated livestock.  How would you rank the following options for establishing 
indemnity payments (1= highly preferred, 4 = not preferred)? 
______ Indemnity equal to current market value of animal if sold on day of claim 
______ Indemnity equal to current market value or cost to raise animal, whichever is the 
highest but requires feedlots sharing farm receipts 
______ Indemnity funds available based upon evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity 
practices being in place through feedlot inspection 
______ Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums 
are subsidized by the government 
 
Q8 In what state does your operation primarily feed cattle? 
 Drop down list of every state 
 
Q9 How many fed cattle were sold on your operation in the last 12 months? 
 Less than 1,000 head 
 1,000 to 1,999 head 
 2,000 to 3,999 head 
 4,000 to 7,999 head 
 8,000 to 15,999 head 
 16,000 to 23,999 head 
 24,000 to 31,999 head 
 32,000 to 49,999 head 




Q10 Of the animals placed on feed in the last 12 months, what percentage did your 
operation own (as opposed to someone outside the operation retaining ownership)? 
 0% (1) 
 1 to 20% 
 21 to 40% 
 41 to 60% 
 61 to 80% 
 81 to 100% 
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